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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 CWB1, LLC (“CWB1”) appeals from an order of the District Court denying its 
request for a preliminary injunction.  For the reasons stated herein, we will reverse the 
District Court‟s order and direct that the injunction be issued in CWB1‟s favor. 
I. 
                                              
1
 The Court notes that Counsel for Botti and Wynn, Anthony J. Fusco, Jr., failed to 
appear for the scheduled oral argument in this matter, despite his acknowledged receipt of 
the notification of oral argument.  Although we decline to take further action in this 
regard, his absence and subsequent correspondence with the Court demonstrates a lack of 
professionalism rarely seen and hopefully not repeated before the Court.  We also note 
that Mr. Fusco‟s absence had no bearing on the outcome of this appeal. 
 3 
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
Joseph A. Cerniglia was a renowned chef and partial owner of Campania, a 
restaurant in Fairlawn, New Jersey.  CWB1, a New Jersey limited liability company, 
owned Campania.  Riccardo Botti, Kevin Wynn, and Cerniglia held ownership interests 
in CWB1 as members.  On October 25, 2005, CWB1 purchased a life insurance policy 
(the “Policy”) from The Guardian Life Insurance Company of America (“Guardian”).  
The Policy named Cerniglia as the insured, and listed CWB1 as the owner and 
beneficiary.  On September 16, 2010, Cerniglia, Botti, and Wynn sold their interests in 
CWB1 to Campania Holdings Corporation (“CHC”) pursuant to a transfer agreement.  
Philip Neuman is the managing director of CHC.  On September 24, 2010, Cerniglia 
died.  In the months following, Campania‟s business declined significantly, and it was 
eventually closed. 
After Cerniglia‟s death, Guardian faced competing claims to the Policy death 
benefit, and filed an interpleader complaint against CWB1, CHC, Cerniglia‟s estate, 
Melissa Cerniglia (Cerniglia‟s widow), Botti, Wynn, and Valley National Bank.2  CWB1 
and CHC filed an answer and a cross-claim against the estate, Melissa Cerniglia, Botti, 
and Wynn seeking a declaratory judgment that those parties had no rights under the 
                                              
2
 Guardian subsequently released Valley National Bank from the lawsuit. 
 4 
Policy and moved for a preliminary injunction directing payment of the Policy death 
benefit.  Neuman submitted a declaration describing the negative impact of Cerniglia‟s 
death on Campania‟s business.  In response, Botti and Wynn disputed payment of the 
Policy death benefit to CWB1 based on their belief that ownership of CWB1 had reverted 
to them because Neuman breached the transfer agreement.  Botti and Wynn suggested 
that a breach of contract action would be filed, but no such claims were before the 
District Court.
3
  In the meantime, the estate and Melissa Cerniglia withdrew their claims 
to the Policy death benefit. 
At the preliminary injunction hearing before the District Court, CWB1 argued that 
all parties agreed that CWB1 was the beneficiary of the policy and, notwithstanding any 
breach of contract litigation, the Policy death benefit should be paid to the company.  
Counsel for Botti and Wynn stated that “[o]bviously we all agree that the money is to be 
paid to the corporation,” meaning, to CWB1.  (App. at 199.)  But, Botti and Wynn argued 
that it should not be paid because of the uncertainty as to the proper ownership of CWB1.  
The District Court rejected CWB1‟s arguments, ruling that the company failed to 
establish a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm.  The District Court 
reasoned that ownership of CWB1 would have to be resolved before the company 
received the Policy death benefit.  The District Court also concluded that CWB1‟s 
allegations of irreparable harm were insufficient and unsupported.  In doing so, the 
                                              
3
 The parties have represented to the Court that a breach of contract claim is 
pending in New Jersey state court. 
 5 
District Court refused to allow Neuman to testify regarding the statements set forth in his 
declaration.  On November 30, 2010, the District Court granted Guardian interpleader 
relief and released it from any liability.  The sum of the Policy death benefit, plus 
interest, was deposited with the clerk of court.  CWB1 filed a timely notice of appeal.
4
 
II. 
 “[W]e use a three-part standard to review a District Court‟s decision to grant or 
deny a preliminary injunction.”  Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2006).  
“The District Court‟s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, the District Court‟s 
conclusions of law are evaluated under a plenary standard, and the ultimate decision to 
grant [or deny a] preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  Id. 
III. 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 provides that “[p]ersons with claims that may 
expose a plaintiff to double or multiple liability may be joined as defendants and required 
to interplead.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a)(1).  In an interpleader action, “the court determines 
whether the interpleader complaint was properly brought and whether to discharge the 
stakeholder from further liability to the claimants.”  Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis, 
                                              
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Guardian‟s interpleader complaint and 
CWB1‟s counterclaim against Guardian pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity 
jurisdiction.  The District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over CWB1‟s cross-claim 
against Botti and Wynn pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Our source of jurisdiction is 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
 6 
553 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
  Then, “the court determines the respective rights of 
the claimants to the interpleaded funds.”  Id.  In evaluating whether a preliminary 
injunction should issue, we consider “(1) the likelihood that the moving party will 
succeed on the merits; (2) the extent to which the moving party will suffer irreparable 
harm without injunctive relief; (3) the extent to which the nonmoving party will suffer 
irreparable harm if the injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.”  Liberty Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 562 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2009). 
A.  Likelihood of CWB1‟s Success on the Merits 
With respect to the likelihood of success on the merits, CWB1 argues that the 
District Court erred in concluding that the litigation regarding ownership of the company 
had to be resolved before the Policy death benefit could be paid.  We agree.  The 
litigation over ownership of CWB1 is irrelevant to CWB1‟s claim.  Indeed, the Policy is 
explicit on this point – CWB1 is the named beneficiary.  (App. at 60 (“Guardian will pay 
the death proceeds to the beneficiary[.]”))  Moreover, New Jersey law makes clear that 
members of a limited liability company are distinct from the LLC itself.  The New Jersey 
Limited Liability Company Act, 42 N.J.S.A. § 42:2B et seq., describes the limited 
liability company as a distinct legal entity, separate and apart from its member owners.  
New Jersey courts also have emphasized that a life insurance policy is a company asset 
                                              
5
 The threshold requirements for rule interpleader were satisfied.  Diversity of 
citizenship was present between Guardian (a citizen of New York) and the Estate, 
Melissa Cerniglia, CWB1, Botti, and Wynn (citizens of New Jersey).  The amount in 
controversy exceeded $75,000. 
 7 
where, as here, the policy names an employee as an insured, the policy lists the company 
as the beneficiary, and the company pays for the policy.  See, e.g., Equitable Life Assur. 
Soc’y. of U.S. v. New Horizons, Inc., 146 A.2d 466, 467 (N.J. 1959) (“Although the 
employee is the „insured,‟ the employer is the applicant for, and owner and beneficiary 
of, the policy.”); Mitzner v. Lights 18, Inc., 660 A.2d 512, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994) aff’d 660 A.2d 480 (N.J. 1995) (“[K]ey man insurance, which reimburses an 
employer upon the death of a key employee or principal, is owned by the employer who 
also applies for and is the beneficiary of the policy.”).  CWB1, Botti, and Wynn agree 
that the company is, indeed, the lawful beneficiary.  The argument advanced by Botti and 
Wynn focuses on their belief that the Policy death benefit should not be paid to CWB1 
because they assert Neuman is no longer the lawful owner.  This contention ignores the 
formalities of the limited liability company and incorrectly equates Neuman with CWB1.  
Even if CHC, with Neuman as managing director, is not the lawful owner of CWB1, that 
does not change the fact that CWB1 is the beneficiary.  Because CWB1 demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits in that it is the beneficiary of the Policy death benefit, 
the District Court erred in concluding otherwise. 
B.  Likelihood of Irreparable Harm to CWB1 
 “The irreparable harm requirement is met if a plaintiff demonstrates a significant 
risk that he or she will experience harm that cannot adequately be compensated after the 
fact by monetary damages.”  Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  Mere economic harm is insufficient; rather, “the plaintiff must demonstrate 
 8 
potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a 
trial.”  Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989).  
“Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control of reputation, loss of trade, and 
loss of good will.”  Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 At the preliminary injunction hearing and in its submissions to the District Court, 
CWB1 maintained that it would suffer irreparable harm because Campania would be 
forced to shut down, employees would be laid off, and the restaurant would lose its 
growing customer base.  CWB1 argues that the District Court erred in rejecting its 
evidence of impending harm and refusing to allow Neuman to testify regarding the 
company‟s financial status.  We agree.  Although CWB1 essentially seeks a monetary 
payment, its posture as a claimant to an interpleader stake distinguishes this case from the 
traditional notion of economic harm.  CWB1 may recover only the Policy death benefit; 
monetary damages in the traditional sense are not available to it in this instance.  
Moreover, its allegations – amply supported in Neuman‟s declaration – of the impending 
loss of key employees, as well as a decline in its customer base, sufficiently demonstrates 
a likelihood of irreparable harm to CWB1.
6
  See id. at 726.  Without the payment of the 
Policy death benefit, CWB1 cannot be made whole.  See Brenntag Int’l. Chems., Inc. v. 
Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (irreparable harm is found “where, but 
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 Because CWB1 properly supported its allegations of irreparable harm, the 
District Court abused its discretion in prohibiting Neuman from testifying to that effect. 
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for the grant of equitable relief, there is a substantial chance that upon final resolution of 
the action the parties cannot be returned to the positions they previously occupied”).  This 
is due to the fact that CWB1‟s main asset was Cerniglia‟s talent as a chef, which the 
Policy was designed to protect and allow the company to continue operating upon his 
death.  The Policy death benefit is a necessary financial resource that must be paid 
without delay if the company has any possibility of rehabilitating its business.  Because 
CWB1 has no other remedy at law, the District Court clearly erred in finding that 
CWB1‟s harm was compensable by monetary damages.  Given that the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction is “the only way of protecting [the company] from harm,” Instant 
Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801, CWB1 established a likelihood of irreparable injury. 
C.  Potential Harm to Botti and Wynn 
 Although the District Court did not address the remaining two requirements, we 
may nonetheless evaluate them where, as here, the record provides a sufficient factual 
basis to do so.  See Kos Pharm., 369 F.3d at 712.  Before the District Court, CWB1 
argued that Botti and Wynn would suffer no harm if the injunction was issued.  Botti and 
Wynn did not articulate any allegations of harm on their behalf.  Their focus on alleged 
breaches of the transfer agreement was misplaced, as these claims were not before the 
District Court.  “We have recognized that [t]he more likely the plaintiff is to win, the less 
heavily need the balance of harms weigh in his favor.”  Id. at 729.  Considering that 
CWB1 established a strong likelihood of success, any harm Botti and Wynn might suffer 
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is outweighed by the harm to CWB1 absent an injunction.  CWB1 met its burden to 
establish this factor. 
D.  Public Interest 
 Finally, CWB1 maintains that the public interest favors the grant of a preliminary 
injunction.  “[I]f a plaintiff demonstrates both a likelihood of success on the merits and 
irreparable injury, it almost always will be the case that the public interest will favor the 
plaintiff.”  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 
1427 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994).  Such is the case here.  As CWB1 alleged, directing payment of 
the Policy death benefit to CWB1 furthers the public interest by facilitating the 
company‟s ability to continue operations and enforceing the plain language of the Policy.  
Because CWB1 met its burden to establish each element required to obtain a preliminary 
injunction, the District Court abused its discretion in rejecting its request.  Going forward, 
the District Court should order the release of the Policy death benefit to CWB1 without 
delay. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the District Court and 
remand so that the District Court may direct payment of the Policy death benefit to 
CWB1. 
